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except by Parliament itself. It is not possible for a 
New Zealand court to strike down legislation on the 
grounds that it offends against the constitution or 
derogates from the basic freedoms guaranteed by a Bill 
of Rights. 
Because of this Parliament must be extra careful when it 
enacts laws which seek to restrict a ci tizens access to, 
for instance free speech or freedom of assembly. Such 
concerns were clearly on the minds of the Parliamentarians 
when they debated the Summary Offences Bill. 
The Hon. J.K. McClay, Minister of Justice said when 
introducing the Bi 11: 
3 
At its core, however the Police Offences Act 
is that part of our criminal code that sets 
the limits on how we can behave and what we 
can say in a public place. For that reason 
and because of it's potential reach into the 
area of free speech, it is of central 
import ance to our criminal and constitutional 
law. 
The need for reform of the Police Offences Act was recognised 
by Parliament in 1973 whe n Hon. Dr. A.M. Finlay, Minister of 
. 4 
Justice mov e d: 
That the Statutes Revis ion Committee be 
instructed to consider the Police Offences 
Act 1927 and to report to the House what 
changes, if any, it considers should be made 
in t rE law in light of present day attitudes 
and social condi tions. 
This Committee ca ll ed for and h eard many submissions
5
, 
f 
. 6 
o which I 1 11 consider later . They exillllined all th e 
some 
provisions of the Act and commented on changes they thought 
desirable. In regard to section 3(eee) the Committee 
recommended "No change" as it was divided on it's views. 
However, substantial change was to occur in section 3(eee), 
as with most of the Act, but such major legislative reform 
is a slow process and it was not until 10 June 1981 that 
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the Summary Offences Bill was introduced into Parliament. 
Subsequently, the Bill was referred again to the Statutes 
Revision Committee which heard nume1eous submissions 
. 7 
on the Bill, from a wide variety of groups and 
8 
individuals, some also of which will be considered later. 
Both major political parties supported the reform while 
disagreeing on some clauses which are outside the scope 
of thi s paper . So without too much rancour the Bill 
passed through the Committee stage, with a number of 
alterations being made, and in due course after receiving 
a second and third reading and Royal Assent it became 
law effective from 1 February 1982. 
That brings us to section 22 itself, however in order to 
get a perspective on this current provision it is important 
to consider the Common Law, past New Zealand statutes 
and past and current United Kingdom statutes in the area. 
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
9 
A. Common Law 
Public nuisance was a Common Law misdemeanour. 
of:10 
It consisted 
an a ct not warranted by law or an 
omission to discharge a legal duty which act 
or omission obstructs or cause inconvenience 
or damage to the public in the exercise of 
rights common to all His Majesty's Subjects. 
If someone suffered damage from a public nuisance they could 
maintain an action for damages in tort . 
The most common and important public nuisance is obstruction 
11 
of a highway. As the Common Law has always recognised a 
citizen 's right to use a public place for the purpose of 
"passing and repassing ... for the purposes of legitimate 
12 
travel" then any action which interferes in an appreciable 
way with this right of passage is a nuisance. Gibson J. in 
13 "b d Lowdens v. Keaveney descri e the Common Law right and 
offence as follows : 
14 
A public highway is primarily for the free 
passage of t he public for all reasonable 
purposes of business or pleasure (but) 
... where the use of the highway is unreasonable 
or excessive that is a nuisance irrespective 
of any guilty or wrongful intent. 
However, while the courts have recognised the citizen ' s 
Common Law right "to pass and repass" the law has always 
drawn a distinction between moving and static meetings 
on the highway. The former is just an aggregate of people 
exercising their Common Law right while the latter is a 
civil trespass against the owner of the land, usually a 
local authority, and may if it unreasonably obstructs, be a 
public nuisance.
15 
This historical distinction is relevant 
when considering the statutory offences today. 
~ 
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B. United Kingdom Statutory Provisions 
However, Ior many centuries the English Par]iarnent has 
legislated in the public order area. Originally statutes 
were introduced in England in responGe to seridom breakjng 
down and as a way to keep peasants tied down to one place 
of work and to stop them wandering around . Stephens describes 
. . . 16 
the situation in the 14th Century as: 
Statute after statute fr:as) µassed in the reign 
of Rj chard I I ref err inc_i Lo Li1e numb r of persons 
who wandered aboul the country and committed all 
sorts of crimes leaving their masters, associating 
in bands and ov0rawing authorities. 
The problem was one of significance because in 1547 Parliament 
17 
enacted that: 
... every loitering and idle wanderer who will 
not work is to be taken as a vagabond and branded 
with a ' V ' and adjudged a slave Ior two years 
to any person that demands him . 
Many more Acts were passed and repealed Lhrough the centuries 
up unt i l the 19th Century dealing with public order. 
The writer believes the other major influences on Parliament 
which became more important in the 18th and 19th Centuries 
which occassioned obstruction of highway provisions were 
the need to keep the streets clear, so traders and commerciaJ 
folk cou ld carry out their business more easily and finally, 
the need to regulate horse and carriage traffic to stop the 
18 
towns becoming congested and dangerous to passerbys. 
To counter the situations t h at arose many specifically 
worded sections were enacted like section 14(8) of the 
Metropolitan Police Act 1839
19 
which made it and offence 
to : 
... roll or carry any cask , tub, hoop or whe •l 
or any ladder plank, pole showboard or placard, 
upon any footway, except for Lhc purpose or 
loading or unloading any cart or carriage or 
of crossing the footway. 
-0 • 
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However more important were t h e general provis i ons relating 
20 
to obstruction . Section 72 of the Highways Act 1835 made 
it an offence if a n y person' ' .. .. shall in any way wilful l y 
obstruct t h e free passage of any s uch highway ." Section 14(6) 
f h M 1 . P 1· A 
21 d 1·t ff o· t e etropo itan o i ce et ma e an o ence to: 
... by means of any cart, carriage, sledge, 
tru ck or barrow or any horse or other animal, 
... wilfully interrupt any public crossing 
or wilfully cause any obstruct i on in any 
t horough fare . 
So the Common Law offence of public nuisance and the statutory 
offenc e s rela t ing to public order and obstruction have a long 
history which was reflected i n the early laws of New Zealand . 
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III. NEW ZEALAND LAW ON OBSTRUCTION OF A HIGHWAY UP UNTIL 1982 
A. 1840 - 1884 
In 1858 the New Zealand Parliament removed doubts regarding 
what law had b e en inherited into New Zealand from 
. 22 . h . England by passing the English Laws Act whic said that 
the laws of England,so far as they were applicable to the 
colony (which were) in force at 14 January 1840, were made 
the laws of New Zealand. That meant that the general 
provisions of both the Highways Act and Metropolitan Police 
Act probably applied in New Zealand. However, before long the 
New Zealand Parliament repealed the English statutes and 
enacted statutes of it 1 s own. After a series of Vagrancy 
Acts~
3 
whose provisions mimicked the English statutes~
4 
and 
a £ailed attempt in 1868 to pass a Police Offences Act
25
, 
Parliament in 1884 repealed all the Vagrancy Acts and provincial 
statutes and enacted the Police Offences Act 1884. 
B. Section 4(l)(p) 
1 . General outline 
Part I of this Act was headed "General Police 
Provisions" and it contained a myriad of provisions 
reminiscent of the English stalules, regulating 
public behaviour. Section 4(12) read: 
Section 4: Every person is liable to a 
fine not exceeding ($20) who 
in or upon any public place -
(12) wilfully or negligently encumbers 
or obstructs a public way in any 
manner not before specifically 
described. 
Preceeding subsection 12 were a great variety of specific 
obstruction offences concerned mainly with animal 
tending and bovine transportation. 
Nowhere in the Act was "encumbers" or "obstructs" 
defined,while public place was defined in section 2 
as: 
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. .. includes and applies to every road, 
street, footpath, footway, court, alley 
and thoroughfare of a public nature or 
open to or used by the public as of 
right and to every place of public resort 
so open or used . 
This obstruction provision remained unaltered until 
being repealed in 1981 apart from being renumbered 
section 4 ( 1) (p). 
2. Cases on section 4(l)(p) 
There are a number of reported Magistrate Court 
decisions and a Supreme Court decision on section 
4(l)(p) . The first is the Supreme Court decision 
26 of Adams v. Horan, where Edwards J . in upholding 
a lower Court decision found that a bookmaker 
who was in the habit of using Vulcan Lane (a narrow 
~ 
mid city lane in Auckland) as a place to meet<-
clients was guilty of "wilfully obstructing a 
public place". Edwards J. had no difficulty in 
establishing that there was an actual obstruction 
as pedestrians had to walk on to the street to 
avoid Adams and his associates, however, Edwards J . 
said this was not sufficient when he affirmed 
A . . h 27 dams submission tat : 
... any lawful act which is a reasonable 
user of the highway is not an obstruction 
within the meaning of the statute . 
However Edwards J . considered that Adams acts were 
not a reasonable user and thus sustained the conviction . 
. 28 
He said : 
In determining whether or not there has 
been a reasonable user of the highway all 
the circumstances must be looked at, 
including . .. the antecedent user of the 
highway by the person charged with 
obstructing it. If, as the result, the 
irresistable inference is that the person 
charged with obstructing the highway is not 
making a reasonable use of it as a highway 
and, a fortiori, if the legitimate inference 
is that he is not using it as a highway at 
al 1, but for some other purpose, and if the 
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result of his acts is such as to impede 
the fre e use of the highway as a highway, 
t hen h e may be proper ly found guilty o f 
e ncumbering or obstructing it , and this 
none t he les s if the particular act in 
r~spcct of which the charge is laid is 
such as to cause no more act ual obstruction 
than might be caused by the lawful user of 
t he highway by a person using it as a 
highway. 
So from Adams it seems that before an act whi ch impedes 
passage along a highway becomes an illegal obstruction it 
must having regard to its character and circumstances 
be shown to be unr easonab l e. 
This was certainly how the United Kingdom Courts inter-
preted similar statutory provisions. 
r.29 
Edwards J. approved of the decision in Lowde ns v. Keaveney 
wher e Lowden s was c har ged under Section 13 of the Summary 
crurisdiction Act 1851 JO which made it an offence to 
"wilfully or by negl i gence or misbehaviour prevent or 
interrupt the f r ee passage of any person or carriage 
o n any public road or s treet." Here the defendant 
allegedly wilfully interrupted and prevented free 
passage in a city street by leading a band down the 
street playing a p a rty tune . The defendant was convicted 
at first instance but his appeal was upheld. Lord O'Brien 
L.C.J. after acce pting that there was a physical 
obstructio,n, and that it was wilfull in the sense that 
the defendant must be presumed to intend the natural 
consequences of his act~ qu ashed the convictions on 
the grounds that the magistrate did not find the 
procession unreasonable. The court defined " obstru ction " 
in the statute in the same way as it was defined in the 
Common Law offence of public nuisance. 
. 31 
L. C. J. said: 
Lord O'Brien 
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These instances show that taking part in a 
procession which has caused obstruclion in 
the stree t ... is not enough to c reate 
.• !iability under the statute . There musl be 
something mor e . What more must there be? 
This, namely th c1 t the user of the street was 
unreasonabl e . 
There arc a number of New Zealand Magistrate Court 
decisions on sect ion 4(l)(p) r ported. However, it 
is the opinion of the writ e r that because the 
reasoning in the decisions is so briefly stated and 
at times quite uncl e ar that these cases are difficult 
a nd unsatisfactory authorities to cite . 
32 . 
Police v. Elwood is such a case. Here the defendant 
parked his car on the left hand side of the road, 
and opened his door only to cause a cyclist to crash 
. . 33 . . into it. He was charged with obstruction but the 
information was dismissed by Luxford SM because as 
h · d A 34 . 35 e interprete dams he said the law was: 
... not directed to negligent acts whil e 
lawf ully using the highway but to wilfull 
and negligent acts while unlawful l y using 
a hi ghway if other persons are thereby 
impeded. 
With respect this is not what Adams said at all. 
Certainly, Edwards J. was more likely to find an 
unlawful act causing an obstruction as being more 
unreasonable than a lawful act causing the same 
obstruction, however , he never contemplated that a 
lawful act could never be an obstruction . This is 
clear from the passage quoted on page 8 wher e 
Edwards J. says that lawful ac ts which are a 
reasonable user are not offences, the implicatio n 
being that lawful acts which arc unreasonable could 
be o££e nc es . So if Luxford SM had wanted to :follow 
Adams h e should have asked if Elwoods action was in 
£act an obstruction and if so, was it unreas onab l e 
in the circumstances? 
~ 
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36 
In Police v. Cane, Page SM, convicted a hypnotist 
of obstruction because he placed a mesmerised woman in a 
shop window which partly as a result of his 
advertising drew a large crowd which obstructed 
the footpath. The Court found Cane's act wilfull 
as he must be presumed to intend the probable 
consequences of his voluntary act. The Court held 
that there was an offence committed as it was a 
natural and probable consequence £or a crowd to 
gather to see the woman and thus to obstruct the 
footpath. It is not made clear in the decision, 
but presumably the court found Cane's acts unreaso n-
able and further that Cane was found guilty as a 
principal as it was his act which caused the 
obstruction. 
. p 1 · A 37 On the other hand in o ice v. dams Bruce Ltd 
the defendant Company was acquitted of a charge 
under section 4(l)(p). Adams Bruce Ltd retailed 
chocolates and when they had chocolates to sell 
queues formed outside their shop as chocolates 
were in scarce supply due to wartime shortages. 
Adams Bruce Ltd admitted that there was a physical 
obstruction, but resisted the charge claiming; 
Firstly, that they couldn't be made liable as a 
party to the offence as an aider and 
abettor; 
Secondly, that the obstruction was not unreasonable, 
and 
Thirdly, that the acts of the defendant were not 
obstructive. 
Althou gh not an easy judgement Lo 1ollow it seems 
that Lawry SM agreed with all three submissions. 
He agreed that to be an aider and abettor one needs 
intent and here Adams Bruce Ltd had no intent, in 
fact they staggered shop hours and didn't advertise 
-0 • 
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to try and stop queues forming (although the 
writer would submit that they surely had sufficient 
intent as they had knowledge of a certainty as 
queues always formed when they sold chocolates). 
Secondly, Lawry SM said the obstruction had to be 
unreasonable and he re it wasn't as Adams Bruce Ltd 
was only exercising it's reasonable right to trade 
and, thirdly, and again unclearly Lawry SM noted 
38 Gavin Duffy' s J view in Campbell v. Hannaford and 
seemed to interprete it to mean that no act is an 
obstruction if the act does not itself directly 
obstruct the footpath. As Adams Bruce Ltd had not 
actually obstructed the footpath they had not 
committed the offence. 
It is the writers opinion that Lawry SM reached a 
fair and correct decision, however, it was done in 
an awkward way. Rather than try and maintain that 
there was no actionable obstruction for which 
Adams Bruce Ltd was liable because it had done 
nothing actively obstructive, Lawry SM would have 
been better to find that Adams Bruce Ltd had caused 
an obstruction, but that in the circumstances such 
an obstruction was reasonable. Lawry SM could have 
considered that as Adams Bruce Ltd was only carrying 
on it's lawful business in an ordinary way and was 
doing it's best to minimise the obstructions caused, 
that in the circumstances the obstruction caused 
39 was not unreasonable. By following this approach 
Lawry SM would have been in accord with the authority 
40 
of Adams and would not have to have resorted to 
the dubious distinction made in Campbell. 
The final reported case on section 4(l)(p) is 
Police v. Gillies~
1 
Here the defendant had parked 
his car legally, but the rear portion of the car 
42 overhung the footpath sufficient Lhat : 
~ 
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... an unwary pedestrian passing along 
t h e footpat h in the ordinary way may have 
collided with the overhanging portion of 
the car . 
This was sufficient for Luxford SM to justify a finding 
that there was an obstruction . Luxford SM inferred 
n egligence for not considering the obstruction ~1en 
parking. Therefore the defendant was convicted. 
This is a curious decision from the same Magistrate 
who decided El wood because there Luxford SM said 
sect i on 4(l)( p) was not designed to catch people 
who did lawfu l acts negligently so Elwood escaped 
liabil i ty . Yet it would seem ihai Gil l ies act was 
a lawful use of t he highway as he had parked his 
car in complete accordance with local authority 
bylaws and regulations, but nonetheless Luxford SM 
found his act n e g ligent and convicted him . 
3 . Summary of section 4(i ) (p) 
In summary ii is difficult io draw together a clear 
pict u re of how section 4(l)(p) was interpreted . 
Firstly, because so few cases are reported and 
secondly, because most of Lhose that are unsatis-
factorily reasoned or unclear in Lheir meaning . 
44 
Adams Bruce Ltd reasoning is extremely difficult 
f 11 d d C 45 . . l to o ow and un erstan . ane is incomp eiely 
reasoned . Finally, Luxford SM ' s decisions in 
Gillies
46 
and Elwood
47 
deal in a very cursory way 
with cases that are more concerned with traffic and 
transport regulation t h a n maintenance of public 
order and as I mentioned earlier Luxford SM did 1mt 
seem sure as to what test he should apply to 
ascertain the guilt or otherwise of the accused . 
- 14 -
The a bove circumstances illustrate just how 
difficult the Magistrate Court decisions are 
to cite as authority . This effectively leaves 
us with the Supreme Court decision of Adams v. 
48 
Horan. As this decision was in line with 
1 · · · 
49 
h . t b 1 . th "' Eng ish authorit i es t e wri er e i eves a~ 
i t was probably fairly strictly applied . 
summary this case stood for the following 
propositions . 
In 
Firstly, although not an issue before the Court, 
as the defendant never denied causing an actual 
physical obstruction,Edwards J . did briefly 
contemplate that someone wou ld have to be impeded 
for there to be an o £fence when he said that it 
was enough to convict the defendant if : 50 
. . the a ppellant was not using the 
highway as a highway, but for some other 
purpose and that his continued and 
repeaJed presence there did impede the 
lawful user of the highway by the general 
public . 
Al though one should note that no one was actually 
obstructed in Gillies . 
Secondly, no physical obstruction of a public way 
is an offence unless it is unlawful or unreasonable 
in the circumstances, and 
Thirdly, whether an obstruction is reasonable or 
not, is a quest ion of fac l which depends on the 
circumstances . Many different circumstances may 
be relevant. Edwards J . found the use to which 
the alleged obstructor was u sing the highway 
very relevant. 
~ 
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Section 3(eee) 
1. General outline 
In 1958 Parliament passed the Police Offences 
Amendment Act 1958 which by section 2(1) 0£ that 
Act added section 3(eee) to the principal Act. 
Section 3(eee) reads: 
Section 3 "Every person is liable to a 
fine not exceeding $SO who 
(eee) without lawful authority or 
reasonable excuse obstructs any 
footpath or footway or carriageway". 
This An1endment Act also inserted section 315(2)(d) into 
the Crimes Act which allowed the Police to arrest 
without warrant,anyone who continued to offend 
against section 3(eee) after having being warned 
to desist. Section 4(l)(p) was not repealed. 
The reason why section 3(eee) was added is not com -
pletely clear as there is no debate on the Amendment 
reported in Hansard , but it was almost certainly due 
to Police pressure. Mr. S . Barnett the then 
Controller - General called for legislative change 
51 
in his 1958 Ann ual Report because of problems with 
gangs of youths who congregated in public places and 
refused to "move on" wh en asked to and refused to 
give their names or addresses when requested to by 
the Police . 52 The Commissioner was concerned Lhat: 
. . . pedestrian s could go to some lengths in 
being insolent provided they did not physically 
obstruct the policeman or insult him. 
Therefore in one important respect the police-
man is powerles s to deal with these gangs . 
They must positively offend before he can 
handle the situation . 
53 
so he proposed that : 
the law be amended giving the Police the 
right to ask anyone who refuses to obey their 
request to "move on" for his name and 
address . If this be refu sed t h ey may thereupon 
be arrested . 
-0 • 
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Ferner SM commented on the amendment in Police v. 
54 .dss Wootton where he sai 
Before Lhe enactment of seclion 3(eee) it 
was at least doubt ful whether the mere 
pedestrian use of the footpath by standing 
or walking, per se constituted an offence. 
Doubtless the present section was enacted to 
provide authority under which pedestrians 
causing unreasonable obstruction would be 
successfully checked. 
It is apparent therefore from the views expressed by 
Mr. S. Barnett and Ferner SM that section 3(eee) 
was introduced as a form of controlling "bodgies" 
and "widgies" and other gangs of the day. The re is no 
doubt that section 4(l)(p) was sufficient to police 
these gangs if an actual unreasonable obstruction had 
occurred, Adams
56 
clearly establishes that, however, it 
is the writer's belief that the Police did not think 
section 4(l)(p) was applicable if no one was actually 
obstructed or impeded and that they desired a means of 
controlling and if necessary arresting these youths at 
an earlier stage to the section 4(l)(p) offen·e . Also 
section 4(l)(p) may as a matter of course only been us d 
57 
to police regulatory type offences like in Adam. Bruce 
G . . 
58 f bl. f . and illies and not or pu 1c order en or cement in 
the criminal sense. 
2. Cases on section 3(eee) 
How then was section 3(eee) interpreted? Two repo rted 
59 
Magistrate Court decisions in 1959 Police v. Hardaker 
60 
and Police v . Wootton both relate to the same evening 
in The Square in Christchurch. Hardaker was asked to 
move along three or four times by the Police because he 
and his friends were obstructing the footpath. On the 
last occasion his name was taken and he was prosecuted. 
In court Hardaker offered no evidence in his defence, but 
moved that the information be dismissed on the 0eneral 
ground that the prosecution had not discharged the onus 
of proof. 
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The prosecution claimed that all they had to do was 
prove the actual physical obstruction and that 
because of section 67(8) of the Summary Proceedings 
Act 1957 the burden on the defendant to show "any lawful 
authority or reasonable excuse" was the persuasive one. 
The defendant submitted 1.ha t the burden of proving any 
excuse which the defendant may have is evidential and 
not persuasive and that it is encumbenl on the pro-
secution to prove the guilt of the accused in every 
case . 
Ferner SM interpreted the effect of section 67(8) on 
61 
section 3(eee) in this way: 
The evidence must be such as to give rise> to 
a reasonable inference that the defendants 
conduct was unreasonable in some respect. 
If the evidence is s u ch as to give rise to 
such an inference then and only then in my 
opinion do the pro v isions of section 67(8) 
come into effect . 
On t h e £acts Ferner SM found there was a reasonable 
inference that t h e conduct wa s unreasonable and thus 
there was a persuasive b urden on the defendant to 
s how " l awful authority or reasonable excuse". The only 
evidence adduced was presented by the prosecution and 
this did not show any lawful authoriiy or reasonable 
exc u se . In the end Ferner SM found that a physical 
obstruction was proved by Lhe prosecution so Hardaker 
was convicted. 
62 
In Wootton t he defendant gave evidence that he was 
meeting friends and that although he did physically 
obstruct the footpath because of his purpose his obstruction 
was not unreasonable . Ferner Sf\1 agreed that mc'ting 
63 
friends was not unreason<lble, hut: 
in my view it is clearly unreasonable to 
join a group on the pavement and stand with 
that group when pedestrian traffic is heavy 
with the result that other pedestrians must 
walk aro und that group or elbow their w<.1y through . 
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Therefore Wootton was also convicted. Ferner SM felt 
the evidence established a reasonable inference that 
the conduct was unreasonable and after considering the 
£acts and Wootton's evidence de c ided in Wootton's "own 
evidence he raised no lawful authority or reasonable 
excuse . " 
However, having looked at Hardaker and Wootton one 
must be careful about taking too much from them because 
Richmond J . in the Supreme Court decision of Police v . 
Stewart
64 
interpreted section 3(eee) and section 67(8) 
in quite a different way. 
Th is case again involved youths in The Square, this 
time Stewart was sitting against a wall so his out-
st r etched legs occupied about three feet of the twelve 
foot width of footpath. In deciding whether the:- e was 
an obstruction Richmond J. expressly adopted the test 
65 66 
given by Grifith J . in Haywood v . Mumford who said: 
obstruction .. . includes any continuous 
physical occupation of a portion of a street 
which appreciably diminishes the space available 
for passing and repassing or which renders such 
passing or repassing less commodious whether 
any person is in fact affected by it or not. 
Stewart was clearly obstructing under this definition. 
Richmond J . then went on to consider on whom the burden 
lies to prove or disprove II J awful authority or reasonable 
excuse." After considering section 3(eee) in light of 
section 67(8) Richmond J. concludes that Ferner SM was 
67 
wrong in law in Hardaker in his interpretation of the 
effect of section 67(8). He says : 
68 
. .. ' withou t lawfu l authority or reasonable 
excuse ' are words of qualification of the 
offence of obstructing a footpath and as 
such £all within section 67(8) 
69 
and thus : 
the onus rests on the prosecution to establish 
an act which is in fact an obstruction of the 
footpath ... and if the prosecution discharges 
this onus then the onus rests on the defendant 
to prove either lawful authority or reasonable 
excuse . 
-0 • 
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By this Richmond J. meant that the prosecution must 
prove the actual obstruction as outlined in the Haywood 
list, beyond reasonable doubt, while the burden on 
the defendant to show a defence is the persuasive on~ 
or as Richmond J. puts it,the onus on the defendant 
70 
is to show: 
Whether or not on the whole of the evidence 
the reasonable probability is that the 
appellant has reasonable excuse for what 
he did. 
Richmond J. went on to say that on the facts the defence 
of "lawful autrori ty" did not arise and that as the 
defendant had no reasonable excuse "such as sudden 
71 
illness or the like he must be found guilty." 
A recent obstruction case which has come to the writ r 's 
attention, but to which he can find no court or newspaper 
72 
report except a short reference in Hansard, may be 
of note. The case concerned seven anti-Springbok Tour 
protesters who were acquitted of a charge of obstructing 
a public way because they were undertaking some form 
. 73 
of sincere demonstration. Presumably the District 
Court Judge must have considered sincere protest "lawful 
au tho ri ty or reasonable excuse " . However lhe writer 
would submit that this case must have been decided on 
very special circumstances because many anti-Springbok 
Tour protesters were convicted under section 3(eee). 
( See Appendix). 
Summary of Combined Effect of Sections 3(eee) and 4(l)(p) 
Police practise since the enactment of section 3(eee) up 
until the repeal of the Police Offences Act in 1981 has been 
to use section 3(eee) almost exclusivcJy over section 4(l)(p) .
74 
The writer would suggest that this was because section 3(eee) 
was considered to have a wider scop ; as a £esult of Stewart, 
convictions were thought easier to obtain; persistent offenders 
could be arrested and finally, but importantly because of 
d 
. . . . 75 
a ministrative practise. So when one summarises the effect 
• 
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of section 3(eee) one is effectively summarising the law 
of obstruction as it has been understood £or the last 
twenty three years in New Zealand. 
As with section 4(l)(p), one Supreme Court decision represenls 
. 76 
the major statement on the law, here it is Police v. Stewart. 
The first major point to be noted is how "obstruct" has 
been interpreted in section 3(eee). Stewart established 
that the test for obstruction was a question of fact; is 
there appreciably less space for the public to pass and repass? 
Richmond J. made it quite clear that evidence that no one 
was in £act obstructed is not relevant to determining wheth~r 
there was an obstruction, but only relevant when one considers 
the reasonableness or otherwise of the defendants acts. 
Support for this view comes from Lord Parker CJ in Nagy v. 
77 
Weston who says whether there is an actual or potential 
obstruction is relevant only in determining the reasonableness 
of the obstructive act . On the oLher hand Edwards J. in 
78 
Adams contemplated that there had to be an actual obstruction 
but as this comment was obiter and relating to a different 
section it was probably not of great authority . So overall 
the weight of authority would suggest that in interpreting 
section 3(eee) evidence that no one was obstructed went to 
assessing the reasonableness of the defendants actions and 
not to denying the existence of the alleged obstruction. 
The second major point to be discussed is whether the phrase 
"without lawful authority or reasonable excuse" was to be 
read as a substantive part of the offence or as a defence. 
Richmond J . sa.id it was a defence to the offence of 
obstruction. By interpreting section 3(eee) in this manner 
he departed from the Common Law definition of obstruction 
in the misdemeanour of obstructing a public way,and from the 
interpretation given to similar statutory provisions both 
. . . 79 
in New Zealand and the United Kingdom, all of which required 
that the obstruction be proven unreasonable as well as 
obstructive before an offence is committed . 
• 
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Furthermore, Richmond J's interpretation is out of
 line 
80 
with recent English authority. In~ v. Weston 
Lord 
Parker CJ had to apply a very similar statutory pr
ovision 
. 81 
to section 3(eee) section 121(1) of the Highways A
ct, 1959 
which reads: 
If any person without lawful authority or excuse 
in any way wilfully obstructs the free passage 
along the highway he shall be guilty of an offence
. 
In interpreting this section Lord Parker CJ said a
fter estab li s h-
82 
ing that there was a wilfull obstruction that: 
before anyo ne can be convicted of this offence 
two further elements must be proved, first that 
the defendant had no lawful authority or excuse 
and secondly that the user to which he was putting
 
the highway was an unreasonable user. 
Richmond J. did not favour such an interpretation 
for 
section 3(eee) as he saw "without lawful authority
 or 
reasonable excuse" not as substantive parts of the
 offence 
which must be proven by the prosecution, but as "
exception(s ), 
exemption(s), proviso(es)or excuse(s)" in terms of
 section 67(8) 
of the Summary Proceedings Act. However, the writ
er would 
submit that there is no reason why section 3(eee) 
could not 
have been interpreted in the same way as section 1
21(1). 
When the Court d ec ides whether a particular phrase
 is an 
"exception exemption proviso or excuse" it must ha
v e regard 
83 
to the: 
... true construction of the enactment as gleaned 
from both it's form and substance and not upon 
the result of any test. 
The writer would s uggest that although the form 0£ sect
io n 3(eee) 
lent itself to Richmond J's interpretation if one 
had regard 
to the substance of the offence then "without lawf
ul 
authority or reasonable excuse" should have been s
ubstantive 
parts of the offence. The major reasons why, were th
at the 
prosecution or plaintiff had always had to prove t
hat the 
defendants actions were unreasonable in civil and 
criminal 
proceedings for alleged obstructions of highways, 
secondly 
because English Courts were currently interpreting
 very 
similar statutory provisions in this way, thi-rdly 
because 
as a matter of principle if two reasonable interpr
etations 
of a statute are available then the one most favou
rable to 
the defendant should usually be chosen and finally
 again, 
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as a matter of principle, t he prosecution should b
e required 
to show wh y the defendant should suffer a l e9al s
anction 
rather t han the defendant (be r e quir ed to show) w
hy he or 
she should not s u ffer that sanction. 
This brings us to the th ird major point in o ur sum
mary of 
section 3 ( eee), that is where the burden of proof
 lay. As 
84 · 1 1 h . bl a result of Stewart regarding" awfu aut ority
 or reasona e 
excuse " as defences to the charge the burden of p
roving them fell 
on the defendant and, as a result of section 67(8) 
of the 
Summary Proceedings Act, that burden was the persu
asive one. 
The prosecution had to prove b eyond reasonable do
ubt that 
there was an actual obstruction although this wou
ld not rave 
been very difficult under the t est fro m Stewart . 
Fourthly we must note how " lawfu l authority " was 
interpreted. 
No New Zealand case in this area considered what 
would 
constitute "lawful aut horit y ". The only referen
ce toil 
was in Stewart wher e Richmond J. said it didn't a
rise on the 
.facts . I n~ v. Weston Lord Parker CJ was incl
jned to the 
85 
view that: 
Lawful a u tho rity or excuse .... and reasonablenes
s 
are really the same ground . 
and he found it difficult to think of any argumen
t that could 
be used to show that the defendants had lawful au
thority to 
obstruct the highway i:f what happened was an unre
aso nabl e 
obstruction. 
However, R.A. Moodie in his submissions to the 19
74 
. 1 C . 
86 d 1 
Parliamentary Se ect ommittee suggeste that"
 aw.ful 
authority" probably includes t he Common Law right 
to " pass 
and repass" for the purposes of legitimat travel . H
e further 
s uggested that as the property of the streets are
 vested in 
. 87 h 
the local authorit½ they may as t e owners , allo
w 
obstructions to occur on their streets . lf one ha s th
e written 
permission of the Town Clerk to hold a gathering 
on a public 
street then arguably one has lawfu l authority to 
cause 
b 
. . l . 88 
o structions consequentia t o that gathering . 
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Fifthly, one must consider what is "reasonable excuse". 
This 
has been discussed in many cases and whether the prosec
ution 
has to show lack of it or the defendant presence of it, 
the 
£actors to consider remain the same. Gibson J. gave a 
concise statement of what might be relevant when assessi
ng 
. . 89 
the reasonableness of the procession in Lowdens: 
The question whether a user is reasonable or not 
is a question of fact to be determined by common 
sense with regard to ordinary experience. Occasion 
duration of the user, place and hour must be con-
sidered; and we must ask, was the obstruction 
trivial, casual, temporary and without wrongful intent. 
So an obstruction may be caused by five youths standing 
in the 
middle of a busy mid city pavement, but it may not be a
n 
obstruction if they only stayed there a short while or 
they 
stood on the same pavement at 8 p.m. when no one else w
as 
around. 
Any number of £actors may go to assessing the "reasonab
leness" 
of the defendants act including t h e factors I considered
 earlier 
regarding lawful authority. 
So to conclude our look at the pre-Summary Offences Act 
law, 
where did the law finally lie?
90 
The writer believes that 
section 3(eee) altered the law on obstruction to give th
e 
Police very much the power they wanted. It gave the Polic
e 
power to deal with individuals and gro ups on the streets
 at 
an earlier stage than they could have before. The Controll
er-General 
of Police wanted a provision that would allow the const
able 
to act be fore the citizen could "positively offend" . . Th
e 
writer understands this to mean that the Police wanted 
a 
power to deal with a person because "they were there" an
d 
causing a potential obstruction and not have to wait un
til that 
person started acting or behaving in an illegal way. This 
certainly was the effect of section 3(eee) as the Police
 couJd 
act if, by the defendants presence, there was appreciab
ly less 
91 
space to pass and repas s and, as a result of Stewart , oc
cupying 
one quarter of the footpath leaves appreciably less spa
ce. 
UW UBRARY 
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The onus then passed to the defendant to show why he or she 
had limi ted the space £or passing and repassing as they had 
done. This made section 3(eee) a very useful a nd powerful 
law a nd order provision. 
A majo r effect of section 3 ( eee) which was aJso desired 
by Mr. S. Barnett was to enable the Po J ice to ask people to 
"move on". Thus the aim of stopping groups loitering on the 
st reets could be achieved by threatening to use section 3(eee) 
but only actually using it against these people who didn ' t 
move on. 
The other major use of section 3 ( eee) was to deal with 
protesters and demonstraters. It was common ly used to deal 
with people protesting ag ainst the South African Rugby teams 
t our of New Zealand in 1981 (see appendix) . Protesters 
who blocked of£ streets or motorways inevitably were charged 
under section 3(eee). 
So having looked at the application and use of section 3(eee) 
one has to decide if such a provision is warranted in total, 
in part or at all. It is with t h ese t houghts that we now 
consider the reform of the law. 
rv. 
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TIME FOR A CHANGE'? 
A. The 1974 Parliamentary Select Committee 
The 1974 Parliamentary Select Committee whose task it wa
s to 
examine the Police Offences Act and suggest changes , if 
any, 
that were needed suggesting drafting an entirely new Act
 
which should deal with matters of general application an
d 
92 
concern,notably law and order. 
In recommending change the Committee set out a guide of 
principles which they thought should be taken into accou
nt 
93 
when formulating the new Act, they were : 
1. Conduct ought not be criminal unless it is the caus
e 
o:f significant harm to society or the individual 
citizens in his or her lawful activities . 
2 . Order and security of person and property are 
fundamental needs of all societies and the criminal 
law has responsibilities in this direction. 
3 . Account must be taken of diverse Jifestyles and the
 
criminal law should notcriminalise behaviour merely 
because most think it eccentric, distasteful or 
immoral . 
4 . Special regard had to be paid to Maori and 
Polynesian lifestyles. 
5. There must be a careful balance between the powers 
and discretion of the Police and the rights of 
the citizen. 
6. Vaguely loosely defined and sweeping offences 
should be avoided. Certainty is to be a principle 
characteristic of the criminal law. 
7. The criminal law should attain it's purpose directl
y 
rather than by using provisions in different Acts 
des i gned for different situations. 
As I mentioned earlier this Committee was unable to agre
e on 
changes to the law of obstruction so it recommended. 'No 
change". 
The two major submissions received on sPction 3(eee) 1.n 
1974 
were from R . A. Moodie, then lecturer in law at Victoria 
U 
. . 94 
n1.vers1.ty and the New Zealand University Student's 
A . . ( ) 95
 
ssoc1.at1.on NZUSA . Both were concerned with how sectio
n 
3(eee) related to demonstrations, public meetings and or
ganised 
dissent. The main point of contention was that moving 
-0 • 
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demonstrations were prima facie not obstructions while 
static demonstrations were, as the Common Law had never re
cognised 
the citizens right to assemble in a public place for a 
meeting . 
removed. 
Both Moodie and NZUSA wanted this distinction 
NZUSA wanted a new provision which stated that mo vi ng 
and static demonstrations are not obstructive themselves
 and 
that demonstraters should only b e punished if they offer
ed 
violence to persons or property. 
Moodie took a more moderate view and said that there was
 no 
logical basis for the distinction between moving and sta
tic 
demonstrations and thus all demonstrations should be reg
arded 
as lawful unless they caused unreasonable interference w
ith 
the public right of way. Moodie sugge sted that if a 
demonstration could remain in one place without fear tha
t the y 
demonstraters were breaking the law then les s inter£eren
c e 
would be caused to the public right of way . 
The writer is of the opinion that Moodies submissions we
re 
sensible and logical while NZUSA in their attempt to pro
t ect 
the right t o protest seemed to b elieve that it was accep
table 
f or demonstraters to subje c t the publi c to severe i nconv
en ience 
as long as there was no damag e to persons or property. 
B. The Summary Offences Bill 
However, when the Summary Offences BilJ appeared in 1981
 it 
was obvious that both s ubmissions h ad been rejected. 
Clause 21,which was eventual ly to become section 22,had 
two 
significant changes from section 3(eee ). Firstly the offende
r 
had to be warne d by a constable to stop the obstruction 
and 
then subsequently continue with it before an offence was
 
committed . In section 3(eee ) the original obstruction was 
an offence and the warning was only given to give the co
nstable 
a power of arrest. 
Secondly " lawful authority" had been deleted in th e Bill
. 
• 
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I will examine both of these changes in the next section
. 
Clause 21 read: 
21 . Obstructing footpath - (1) Every person is 
liable to a fine not exceeding $SOO who, without 
reasonable excuse, obstructs any footpath and, 
having been warned by a constable to desist,-
(a) 
( b) 
Continues with that obstruction; or 
Does desist from the obstruction but sub-
sequently obstructs that footpath again, 
or some other footpath in the same vicinity, 
in circumstances in which it is reasonable 
to deem the warning to have applied to the 
new obstruction as well as the original one. 
(2) In this section "footpath" includes every road, 
street, path, mall, arcade, or other thoroughfare. 
. 11 b . . g 6 
The 1981 Parliamentary Select Committee ea ed £or su m
issions 
and,as in 1974, received a good many. 
The Justice Department in the introduction to their spe
cific 
submission suggested four things that the Committee sho
uld 
. 97 
have in mind. 
Firstly, the Police Of£ nces Act and soon Lhe Summary O
ffences 
Act are the statutes through which the greatest number o
f 
citizens are likely to meet legal sanction apart from m
inor 
traffic matters. 
Secondly, the Acts are of utmost constitutional signific
ance 
as they control nearly all our manifestations of expres
sion 
and conduct by word or deed. 
Thirdly, as we have no Bill of Rights by which a judge c
an 
strike down legislation as derogatory of our basic freed
oms, 
Parliament must be careful not to pass oppressive legis
lation, 
and 
Fourthly, one must carefully weigh constitutional freedo
ms 
against public interest in maintaining law and order and
 
still try and achieve certainty in the law . Specifically in
 
relation to clause 2J, the Justice Department recommended
 that 
P 1
. 98 
o ice v. Stewart be legislated around and that clause 
21 
be altered to; "Allow Police intervention only where there 
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is some public inconvenience". To this end they recommende
d 
that the definition in the American Law Institutes Model 
Penal Code which defines "obstructs" as "renders impassable 
without unreasonab le inconvenience or hazard," be added to 
the section. 
Similar submissions were received from the Victoria University 
99 
of Wellington (VUW) Law Faculty who suggested that the 
offence of obstruction should involve proof that member(s) 
of the public were affected by the defendants obstructive 
behaviour, even better in their opinion would be a require
ment, 
that serious or appreciable inconvenience be caused. 
These two submissions seemed to have an effect because when 
the Bill appeared for it's second reading a definition o.f 
"obstructs" had been added, it was "obstructs in relation to 
a public way means unreasonably impedes normal passage along 
that way". I will look at the effect of this change in the 
next section and consider whether it goes as far as the 
submissions asked it to . 
Another submission received from the VUW Law Faculty suggested 
that there was a minor problem over the interpretation of 
footpath in clause 21. They felt it would be preferable to 
replace "footpath " with "public thoroughfare" to emphasise 
that the offence was restricted to public rights of way. 
As a result "footpath" in subsection 1 was replaced with 
"public way" and the definition in subsection 2 was 
consequently changed, however, the word "footpath" remained 
in paragraph (b) of subsection 1. 
The New Legislation Committee of the AuckJand District Law 
S 
. 100 . . 
ociety took up the issue of static demonstrations and 
recommended that as the clause sought to ens ure a public 
right of way any partial obstruction should be allowed if 
it is not unreasonable in the circumstances. They specirically 
restricted their view to "bona fide demonstrations partici-
pating in a demonstration relating to a matter of public or 
private cone rn." This matt.er was not taken up by the 
Committee. 
• 
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One submission suggested that while the requirement of 
a warning was a good thing in £act three warnings should 
be given b ecause in the context of a demonstration warnings 
may not be heard or may be lhought not to apply to an 
individual and so to ensure lhat all people have received 
due and £air warning more than one warning should be given. 
This submission was also not taken up by the Committee. 
So after hearing the submissions th e Committee made the 
changes outlined in clause 21 and in other clauses of the 
Bill and submitted the Bill to Parliament for it's second 
reading. The Bill passed it's second and third readings 
without change, so by due process of law it became the 
Summary Offences Act, effective from 1 February 1982. 
v. 
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SUMMARY OFFENCES ACT 1981 
A. Section 22 
Obstructing public way - (1) Every person is liable to 
a fine not exceeding $SOO who, without reasonable excuse, 
obstructs any public way and, having been warned by a 
constable to desist, 
(a) 
(b) 
Continues with that obstruction; or 
Does desist from the obstruction but sub-
sequently obstructs that footpath again, 
or some other footpath in the same vicinity, 
in circumstances in which it is reasonable 
to deem the warning to have applied to the 
new obstruction as well as the original one . 
(2) In this section -
"Obstructs", in relation to a public way, means 
unreasonably impedes normal passage along that 
way : 
"Public way" means e very road, street, path, 
mall, arcade, or other way over whic h the 
public has the right to pass and repass. 
B . Suggested Interpretation of Section 22 
At the time of writing, August 1982, no cases concerning 
section 22 have been reported or come to the writer's 
attention. People have almost certainly been convicted under 
section 22 but exactly how the provision has been interpreted 
is not known. 
The question i s how will section 22 be interpreted and applied? 
One of the most important parts of the new Act is the 
definition of "obstructs" which is in subsection (2). The 
question is whether some member of the public must actually 
be obstructed for there to be an offence? The definition 
of " bbstructs" requi:res the re to be an impedance. The 
writer would suggest that as a matter of common sense and 
logic one can't impede nothing or no one . I :f 110 on e is 
impeded then the actor has only "attempted" to impede normal 
passage along the way but not "actually" impeded normal 
passage. If this line 0£ argument is accepted then there 
would have to be an actual impedance for there to be an 
obstruction . 
-0 • 
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A recent Australian case g v. Darling may support this 
view as it said that there was no obstruction unless some 
person is, in fact, actually obstructed or prevented from 
passing. The problem with this case though is that the 
statutory provision interpreted,section 10 of the Summary 
Offences Act 1970 (NSW), makes it an offence to "wilfully 
prevent in any manne r the free passage of a person, vehicle 
or vessel in a public place ... ". This section specifically 
requires that the ' 'frce passage of a person be prevented" 
which makes section 10 much clearer in it's intent than 
section 22. 
So one can ' t be sure that the courts will require an actual 
obstruction to be shown i n fact is is more likely that they 
won't. 
Firstly, because a similar argument could have been made as 
to the meaning of "obstr uct " in s ect ion 3 (eee ) b u t the 
~ourt had no difficulty in saying that whether someone was 
in fact obstructed was only relevant to the r easonab Jeness 
of the defendant's acts. Secondly, Parliament could so 
easi ly have added a claus e like "and therefore inconveniences 
. 103 
any member of the public" to have made it clear that 
someone h ad to be obstructed. They didn't do so , so the 
imp licatio n may be that there is no requirement that an actua) 
obstruction be proved . 
Finally, there are a number of cases mentioned earl ier which 
. . 104 
look at this issue . The weight of those authorities must 
favour the view that eviden ce t hat no one was obstructed only 
goes to the reasonabl e n ess of the defendant ' s ac tion s . 
. 105 
Lord Parker CJ i n Nagy v. Weston said : 
Wheth er or not the us er amounting to an obstruction 
is or is not an unreasonable us e of the highway is 
a ques tion of fact . It depends o n aJl the 
circums t ances, including .. . wheth r it does in 
fact cause an actual obstruction as opposed to a 
pot e ntial obstruction . 
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So overall it is likely that a similar interpretation to
 
that preferred in Stewart will be taken, that is; is 
there appreciably less space for passing and repassing? 
The next point to be noted with regard to the definition
 of 
"obstruct" in section 22 is whether the obstruction has 
to 
be proven unreason able before an offence is committed . 
The 
definition added to subsection 2 after the submissions m
ade 
by the Justice Department and the VUW Law Faculty shows 
a 
106 
definite intention to grapple with Stewart and to mak
e 
it necessary £or the prosecu tion to show unreasonablenes
s 
on behalf of the defendant . However, careless draftin
g has 
clouded this intention because while the definition sect
ion 
says t hat the obstruction must be proven by the prosecut
ion 
to be unreasonable, "without reasonable excuse" has been
 
left i n s ubsection 1 in exactly the same manner as in 
section 3(eee) . This latter clause was interpreted 
in 
Stewart to be a defence to the charge with the onus of 
showing reasonable exc u se lying on the defendant. Read 
lit·eral ly 
section 22 requires the defendant to show "reasonable ex
cuse 
£or causing an unreasonable impedance " to escape liabili
ty . 
The writer can't envisage any situation where the defend
ant 
could show " reasonable excuse" £or causing an obstructio
n 
which has already been found on the facts to be "unrea
sonable". 
The net effect is £or "without reason able excuse" to bec
ome 
quite redundant with the definition in subsection 2 requ
iring 
the pro s ecution to prove that the obstruction was unreas
onable. 
So overall under section 22 the prosecution must prove 
beyo nd reasonable doubt an unreasonable obstruction . How
ever, 
as there are many factors which may affect the reasonabl
eness 
or ot herwise of the defendant's acts, some of which are 
known only to the defendant, the prosecution need not 
negative the existence of all of these factors . 
For instance it may be reasonable for someone to cause a
n 
obstruction because they are feeling unwell and need to 
rest, 
however, the court need not consider this possibility if
 it 
is not raised. To have this matter considered by the co
urt 
-0 • 
• 
- 33 -
the defendant has to raise it,and satisfy the evidential 
burden . Once raised to this standard the prosecution will 
either have to negative the claim or show that notwithstanding 
the illness of the defendant the act was still unreasonable. 
The next issue to be considered is over what is "reasonable" 
or "unreasonable". Mention has already be en made of what 
previous tests courts have taken into account to assess 
the reasonableness or unreasonableness of a defendant's 
. 10 7 . . d . f f action, essentially it comes own to a question o act to 
be decided in 1he circumstances . 
considered include: 
Factors which may be 
time of day of obstruction . 
place obstructed. 
whether anyone was effected. 
how many people were effected. 
length of time of obstruction. 
consequences of t lE obstruction. 
purpose or reason £or obst r uction. 
intent or state of mind of the obstructer. 
degree of obstruction, i.e . trivial parti a l or compl e te. 
circumstances prior to the obstruction. 
whether the obstructer is moving or not . 
whether the local authority has given its permission 
for the activity. 
whether the use of the public place is as a public 
place or _for some o tl1cr purpose, e.g. trade or commerce. 
whether the obstruction was caused as a result of the 
lawful activity of the obstructer exercising his or 
her lawful rights . 
This list is by no means an exhaustive one and other factors 
may arise in the peculiar circumstances 0£ each case. 
A major change in the legislation has been the deletion of 
" lawful authority" as a statutory defence . I cited earlier 
Lord Parker CJ who believed that "lawfuJ authority" and 
"reasonable excuse" arc near enough to the same thing s o as 
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not to matter and Brownlie is of the same belief when he 
108 
says 
Whether there is a lawful excuse seems to 
depend simply on whether the obstruction is 
reasonable . 
However the writer would suggest that the points made by 
R. A. Moodie may be valid. If "lawful authority" was stil] 
recognised as a defence in itself then if someone could 
establish that they were only exercising their Common Law 
right to "pass and repass" then any obstruction causc>d 
incidental to this would be proven to be done with lawful 
authority and thus be a complete defence to the charge. 
However, if lawful authority was only to be considered along 
with other factors Lo determine the reasonableness of the 
act then it might be outweighed by other considerations. 
This may be good or bad depending on the circumstances. It 
may be good in a situation where someone by "passing and 
repassing" is hampering emergency services tending an accident. 
Such behaviour, which one might want to sanction, is almost 
certainly unreasonable, but j_f done with "lawful authority", 
not illegal. However the consequences may also be bad because 
someone may be prosecuted for doing something they are 
lawfully entitled to do. This may now happen in demonstrations 
because, with "lawful authority" no Longer a specific defence>, 
distinction between moving and static demonstration is 
gone. In the past as moving demonstratjons were just a 
collection of people exercising their lawful right to ·~ass 
and repass" any charge for the incid0ntal obstruci.ion caused 
could be resisted. Now a court may decide that in the> 
prevailing circumstances the incidental obst rue t ion caused by 
i.he demonstration is unreasonable and thus an offence, 
nolwilhstanding that the demonstraters were only exercising 
their lawful right . A judge might consider mild disruption 
to peak hotu traffic or i.he admit h'd desire of the Jemonsi.rater 
to disrupt the Prime f'.linister 's passage Lo Parliament 
sufficiently unreasonable to outweigh the reasonable> desire 
to "pass and repass" . 
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The second situation where Moodie thought the defe
nce of 
"lawful authority" had a place was if a local auth
ority had 
given someone permission to do something on the lo
cal author ity's 
land, for instance, to set up a stalJ on the footp
ath or to 
hold a procession, both of which may cause incide
ntal 
obstruction. In the past the fact that both we
re done with 
the lawful authority of the owner of the land wou
ld have 
been sufficient defence to a charge of obstruction
 as long 
as they had done no more than what they had been p
ermitted to 
do . Now the local authority's permission is only 
another factor 
to consider when assessing the reasonableness of t
he accused's 
behaviour . 
This situation raises difficult policy problems. 
On the one 
hand one can't sanction people who arc doing only 
what Lhey 
are legally entitled to do, but on the other hand 
when one 
exercises one's rights there is the accompanying 
responsibility 
to not infringe on the rights of others. On balan
ce it may be 
best to weigh up the arguments for allowing the o
bstruction and Lhe 
arguments against aJ lowing the obstruction and then 
decide which 
claim is more reasonable . 
While this approach seems £air and almost certain
ly what the courts 
will do, the writer believes that it is unfortunate
 that as a 
consequence of this approach demonstraters mo_y los
e some of the 
protection which section 3(eec) gave. Courts may 
regard non 
violcnl expression of dissent as a very reasonable
 act, but then 
again they may no L. If they don't Lh <? n the impor
tant con-
stitutional right of freedom of expression may be 
ndangcred. 
A feature of section 22 is the requirement that a 
warning is to 
be given to the obstructor and the obstructor only
 commits an 
offence if he or she continues with the obstructio
n or reobstructs 
in certain circumstances after initially desisting
. ThC' Poli ce 
claim that this is nothing more than codification
 of current 
practise and that they always gave warnings anywa
y, however, a 
significant reason for this practise was that the 
Police could 
only arrest an obstructor ~fter that person had be
en warned to 
desist. In theory the Police could have summarily p
rosecuted 
an obstructor wi~hout ever having to warn them. 
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Notwithstanding current practise this is a welcome reform 
because the person who has unthinkingly or unwittingly 
caused an obstruction will be able to remedy th~~ matter and 
so avoid prosecution. The requirement of a continuing offe
nce 
or reoffence imports a notion of wilfulness inLo the offence . 
To commit an offence now,the obstructor will because of the 
) 
warning in almost all circumstances, know that they are 
breaking the law if they continue to act as they a.re. This 
would not be true if the offender mistakenly thought that the 
original warning no longer applied, however, this mistake n 
belief may help show the reasonabl ness of the obstructor
1 s 
actions. This situation may occur if the warnings were a 
while 
apart or if the obst.ructor moved to a different area. 
It is unlikely that a general warning given to a group of 
demonstraters will be of effect at a subsequent obstruction 
because of the evidential problem of proving that the accused 
was part of the original obstruction and has thus been 
previously warned. In practise warnings wil] probably have 
to be personal so that a constable if required to, can 
testify that he or she did warn the accused at t he time of 
the original obstruction and that the accused did subsequently 
rcoffend. 
This reform may work to a small degree to reduce harrassment 
by the Po lice because they can no longer just approach an 
obstructer and set in motion a summary proceeding. It is 
important to realise that just because a constab le asks you 
to move along or warns you that you arc obstructing isn't 
109 
actual pr0of that your action is unreasonable. fl e 
unr easonableness must be proven on the facts adduced at th e 
trial. The constable's view that Lhe obstruction was unreasonab
le 
is not sufficient although his or her views may carry more 
authority in Court than the view of others. 
Problems wi th section 22 may be in the interpretation and 
application of section 22(l)(b). This deals wiLh offenders 
who after being warn d to desist from obstructing do so, but 
reobstruct later. 
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The first matter to be considered is what constit u
tes the 
" same vicinity" . Submissions to the Bill ques
tioned the 
scope of "vicinity" but none suggested any interpre
t2.tion nor 
110 
severely criticised the use of the word . The w
ri1er has 
more difficulty in deciding what the scope of "vic
inity" is. 
"Vicinity" is defined in the Shorter Oxford Dictio
nary as:
111 
Neighbourhood . . a wider latlitude than 
p<roximi ty or contigui Ly and may embrace a 
more extended space than that lying contiguous 
to the place in question. 
By this definition and ordinary usage one would co
nsider 
opposite sides of The Square as in the same vicini
ty and 
suburbs in the city as probably not, but would one
 consider 
places half a mile apart in the same vicinity? Th
ere has 
been little judicial interpretation of "vicinit y ".
 So, as 
with so much of section 22, this is a question whic
h the 
~curt will end up deciding, however the writer wou
ld suggest 
that if one is guided by the dictionary definition
 the word 
is capable of broad and extended application. 
The importation of another "reasonableness" test, i
nto 
section 22(l)(b) gives the Court a wide discretion
 as to 
wh en to deem the original warning to be of effect.
 All the 
'reasonableness' 
112 
factors considered earlier could be relevant, 
with the most important ones being the time betwee
n obstruct ions, 
how specific and personal the original warning was
 and whethPr 
the obstructor has moved s ince the original warnin
g and j f so 
how far they have moved. 
A further problem with section 22 arises as a resu
lt of a 
drafting error which se ems to have arisen as a res
ult of 
113 
submissions made by the VUW Law Faculty, who sug
gested 
that "footpath" in the Bill be replaced with "pub
lic 
thoroughfare". " Footpath" was in t he end replaced wit
h " pub lic 
wa.y " wherever it appeared except in section 22(l)(
b). 
is most clearly an error as it is now an offence t
o: 
This 
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Section 22(1) ... Obstruct any public way and having been 
warned by a constable to desist, -
(b) Does desist :from that obstruction but 
subsequently obstructs that footpath, 
or some other footpath in the same 
vicinity ... 
On one potential reading this means that an of:fence is 
corrunitted if the accused obstructs a public way, desists 
after being warned, but subsequently reobstructs on any 
public way which is a footpath. But Parliament clearly 
intended a reobstruction of any "public way" to be an o:ffencc 
(subject to the latter half of paragraph (b) ) not just a 
reobstruction on a "footpath". 
Whether the Courts can apply the section in the manner 
intend ed by Parliament will depend on whether the section 
as it presently is can be sensibly read and applied, if it 
can the courts are bound to do so, however if the section is 
ambiguous and contradictory then by ordinary canons of 
statutory interpretation the courts will take the £air and 
"b . . 114 . . sensi le interpretation which, in this case, will allow 
it to read "that footpath, or some other footpath" as "that 
public way or some other public way ." 
The writer believes that the-> section a s it is presently worded 
is ambiguous and contradictory . This conclusion is reached 
the following way; When paragraph (b) refers to "that 
footpath" this implies that a footpath has been previously 
115 
mentioned or contemplated. No footpath has been previously 
mentioned in subsection 1, but "footpath" is contemplated as 
being included in " any public way", this is obvious :from the 
definition of public way in subsection 2. Thus the referenrn 
to " t ha t footpath" concerns the footpath gener aly contemplated 
as being included in "public way" . So far then it would 
seem that section 22 has a sensible meaning except that it 
is much more limited than intended. 
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However, paragraph (b) does not just refer to "that footpath" 
but it refers to "that footpath or some olher footpath" . The 
ef feet of adding" some other footpath " is to make "tJ-1at 
footpath" a reference to a specifica]ly obstructed footpath. 
How0ver there is no prior mention or contemplation of this 
specifically obstructed footpath only a general reference to 
"any public way" . The end result is that "that footpath" refers 
to a prior mentioned or contemplated specified footpath which 
is in fact not previously mentioned or contemplaled. 
"footpaths" in general are previously contemplated . 
Only 
A reference to a previously referred to thing which is in 
fact not previously referred to is nonsensical and ambiguous . 
Thus to make sense o:[ section 22(l)(b) "that footpath or 
some other footpath" must be read as "that public way or 
some other public way " . lf this is done then section 22(] )(b) 
will achieve what it was intended to achieve and be capable 
of sensible interpretation. 
Of course the most desirable thing would be for Parliament 
to make the suilable amendment to section 22(l)(b) to 
completely avoid these difficulties . 
c. Summary of the Effects of Section 22 
Overal] the writer would summarise the most salient features 
of section 22 and the most likely interpretations as follows. 
Firstly, the test of obstruction from Stewart will be fairly 
closely followed, that is whether there is an obstruclion 
is a question of fact; is lh re appreciably less space 
for passing and repassing? 
Secondly, no actual obstruction need be proven by the 
prosecut i on . 
Thirdly, there is an onus on the prosecution to prove that 
the obstruction was " unreasonable" . The defendant may have 
an evidential burden to raise particular factors for 
consideration . 
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Fourthly, no offence is committed until the defendant has 
been warned to desist and failed to do so, or done so, but 
reobstructed again in the vicinity in circumstances in 
which it is reasonable for the original warnin g lo apply io 
the new obstruction as well as the original one . 
Fifthly, " vicini t:; " will be interpreted fairly broadly so 
warnin gs will be of effect in more than just the immediate 
area . 
Sixthly , section 22(l)(b) will be interpreted to make it an 
offence to reobstruct on any "public way'' after having been 
warne d to desist and not just reobstructions on "footpaths" . 
Seventhly, both static and moving demonstrations are neither 
definitely legal nor illegal. Both are le0al as lon g as 
they don't "unreasonably impede normal passage ~\Jong the 
way " . 
Eighthly, lawful authority or excuse is no longer a sufficienl 
defence . It is only relevant as to assessing the reasonableness 
or otherwise of the defendan ts acts and, finall y . 
Ninthly, one must note that the scope of section 22 will 
depend to a very large ext ent on the Court. Apart fro m the 
court having the option as to how it wi 11 interprete "obstruct" , 
"vicinity" and other terms in the section,it has the task of 
considering when it is ''reasonable' to carry over the effect 
of a warning to a reobstruction and the task of considering 
what makes the impe dance "reasonable or unreasonable." 
The writer has suggested many factors which the Court may 
consider relevant in determining these consideration_ but 
as there is no statutory guid which says what factors arc 
to be considered when ascertaining the reasonableness or 
otherwise of the defendants acts it is not possible to know 
what weight will be attached to what factors. The writ er 
would suggest the three main factors would be, what the alleged 
obstructor is using the public place for, how much actual 
obstruction is being caused and the state of mind or intent 
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of the alleged obstructor . However it is important to 
remember that as determining reasonableness is solely a 
question of fact the test will vary in the particular 
circumstances of each case. 
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CONCLUSION 
The criminal law is in the business of deciding what 
conduct should be legal and what conduct should be illegal. 
Sometimes it is easy Lo know whether conducl shou ld be 
illegal or not but somelimes it is very difficult. For 
instance very few people would want Lo sanction someone £or 
standing talking to a friend on the footpath but most people 
wouJd want to sanction someone for lying down on the street 
disrupting traffic. So the problem is to decide where in 
the spectrum o t- behaviour, which causes actual or potential 
obstruction, should we draw Lhe line belween legal and illegal 
conducl? 
Where each of us would draw the line must depend on our views 
of what the role of the criminal law is. However. just 
because individuals views of this ro]e, and thus views on 
the need £or, or aptness of, a particular law may reasonably 
differ, it is no reason for not questioning the reasons for 
and scope of the present law. 
Why then do we need a law criminalising obs L ructions of the 
highway? 
Mr . S. Barnett the Controller-Gener al in 1958 may have 
said it is needed to stop the threal of more se1iuus offences 
occuring . The writer howeve; would prefer the justifications 
of Lhe 1974 Statutes Revision Commillce whu said, only 
conduct which may cause significant harm to society or the 
individual citizen in his or her JawfuJ acls or conduct 
contrary to the maintenance of law and order, should be 
. 116 
criminalised. 
1£ these are the reasons £or having d law criminalising 
obslructions of the hi ghway, then surely in practisr> the law 
should only criminalise those acts that do cause significant 
harm to socioty or the individual, Lawlessness or disorder. 
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However, it is the writer's belief that section 22 goes further 
than this as,did seciion 3(eee) and possibly section 4(l)(p). 
On the writer ' s interpretation of section 22 acts which are 
lawful and which cause no actual obstruction are potentially 
crimes , if thought by the cour t to be unreasonable in the 
circumstances, the writer would suggest Lhat someone standing 
with a placard on a pavement or sitting on the pavement 
occupying one quarter of the available space or a gro up of 
one thou sand peo ple assembled in an inner city park don't 
cause significant harm to society, disorder or lawlessness, yet 
each one are potenti a lly crimes. The consequence is that 
the citizen ' s right to assemble, demonstrate or air their 
grievances in a public but non violent way or to use the 
highway for any purpose even for passing or repassing are 
potentially restricted . 
The fact that the Police usually don't attempt to stop such 
behaviour or that the Courts probably wouldn't find them 
unreasonable anyway is insufficient justification for the 
present state of the law . The citizen is entitled Lo know 
with much more certainty whether he or she is acting 
illegal ly or not and further the citizen should be entii led 
117 
to act i n what ever "eccentri c immoral or distasteful" way 
they close without fear of sanction as lon g as it doesn't 
cause significant harm to society, lawlessness or disorder. 
Unfortunately section 22 does not provide t hat protection. 
APPENDIX 
Statistical information on how many people were sanctioned 
under obstruction of the highway provisions before 1978 
is sparse . Police statistics re corded obstruction o~fences
 
separately until 1918, but from 1918 - 1977 obstruction 
offences were noted for statistical purposes under either 
"vagrancy", "idle and disorderly" or "breach of the peace". 
Since 1978 statistics have been available under the 
heading "Obstruct Public Place". 
Total Offences Prosecut ed 
No Caution 
Reported* Offence 
1978 77 69 6 
1979 160 143 7 
1980 61 48 7 
1981 571 544 10 
* The discrepancies in totals is due to some of~cnces 
being carried over from previous years. 
Warning 
6 
6 
7 
17 
or 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
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to be caused to any person using the road; 
in any manner not hcrcinbefore described. 
However, the Wellington Town Clerk informed the wrilcr 
that these provisions arc very rarely used, primarily 
because the Wellington City Council does not have the 
manpower and because the Police do a suificient job 
under the general crimjnal law provisions anyway . 
91 . Supra n . 64 . 
92 . 
93 . 
94. 
95 . 
Report on the Police Offences Act 1927 . New Zealand . 
Parliament House of Representatives .Appendix to the 
journals Vol . 4 1974, ISA . 
Supra n. 4, 34 these principles have been paraphrased 
by the writer from those outlined on p.l. 
Supra n.5, 32 . 
Supra n. 5, 138 . 
96 . Supr a n . 7 
97. Supra n . 7, 34, these principles have been paraphrased 
by the writer from those outlined .i.n the submjssion. 
98 . Supra n. 64 . 
99 . Supra n.7, 17, a combined s ubmi ssion was received [rom 
T. Arnold, N . Cameron and D. Sleek of the Law Faculty, 
Victoria University and W. Young, Direction of the 
Institute of Criminology, Victoria University . 
100. Supra . n . 7, 15. 
101. Supra . n . 7, 11. Submission was prepared by C . Tennc 'n t 
R . Lack and S. No ble. 
102. 1974 2 N .S.W.L.R. 542 ( N .S. W. Co ur t of Criminal App al) . 
103 . This claus e was suggested as a reform by the V . U .W. 
Law Faculty . 
104 . Supra part III D 
105. Supra n.77, 80 . 
106 . Supra 
107. Supra 
108 . Supra 
109 . Supra 
n . 6 ·-·. 
pa:ct . 
n . 9, 78 . 
n . 29, 88 Lord O'Brien L.C.J . says: 
... as to the warning of th police, no 
doubt prudent and well disposed citizens will 
promptly accede t o the suggestions of the police', 
and will be slow indeed to incur the reproach 
which would naturally arise from disregarding 
the ad vice of t hose who are charged with the 
pre servation of public order, but, having 
regard to the charge in this case, the 
warning of the Police could not merely of 
itself render the user of the highway 
unreasonable. 
110 . See especially submissions from the New Zealand Federation 
of Labour supra n . 7, :2'3 
111 . 6th edition Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1976, 1296 . 
112 . Supra part VB 
113 . Supra n . 7, 17 . 
114 . See Halsbury ' s Laws of England (3 Pd) Vol . 36, para.584. 
115. Supra n . 111, 1198 . "That" is defined as : 
The person or thing pointed to or drawn 
attention to or observed by the speaker 
at the time or already named or understood 
or in question or familiar. 
116 . From the first and second principles set out as a guide 
to r eform by the 1974 Statutes Revision Committee, 
supra n . 92 . 
117 . From the third principle set out as a guide to reform 
by t he 1974 Statutes Revision Comm·ttee, supra n.92 . 
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